Abstract-Common cause failure (CCF) is a serious threat to Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) reliability. It is therefore important to model and quantify CCF in reliability analysis. Diversity has long been used to protect redundant systems against CCF. Whilst there is clear evidence that diversity can bring benefits when compared with identical redundancy systems, these benefits can be difficult to quantify. Therefore, a novel CCF model which studies CCF from the viewpoint of Root Cause (RC) and Coupling Factor is proposed in this paper. The key parameters of the novel CCF model can be determined based on a stress-strength model by classifying variables of stressors and strengths according to RC categories. An application example is provided that illustrates how the proposed CCF model performs for a chemical reactor safety system (CRSS) for protection against high pressure and temperature. The results not only confirm that diversity techniques lower the CCF probability but also provide quantitative assessment of how large the improvements can be in different diversity techniques.
INTRODUCTION
Safety Instrument systems (SIS) are used in the oil and gas industry to detect the onset of hazardous events and/or to mitigate their consequences to humans, material assets, and the environment [1] . To fulfill its functionality reliably, the availability of SIS has to be high. Thus, to achieve a high degree of availability against random failures, redundancy is commonly applied in SIS. If all system failures are statistically independent events, reliability can be significantly improved through the use of redundancy in the design. However, multiple dependent failures of redundant components are not rare. Common cause failures (CCF) are a subset of dependent failures and can effectively reduce or even negate the benefits of redundancy. IEC 61511 [2] defines a CCF as a failure which is the result of one or more events, causing failures of two or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to a system failure. Diversity is one of the representative common cause defense rules, which has been widely applied in a few safety-significant industries so far, such as the nuclear power industry, aerospace industry, aviation industry, chemical process industry, rail transportation industry, and so on. It is desirable to quantitatively assess the effects of diversity on system reliability because this information can be used to show how system designs can be improved by lowering CCF probability. Related researches have been performed in both theoretical and practical aspects.
In the theoretical aspect, the representative researches are as follows. In [3] , the validation of diversity to enhance system reliability has been verified based on a stress-strength failure model and Monte Carlo simulations. However, how to quantify the effects of diversity on system reliability was not proposed. A metric to quantify diversity among several designs is proposed in [4] . However, the prerequisite to applying the metric to calculate diversity is that the distribution of fault pairs of redundant components has to be known in advance. Therefore, the metric proposed is difficult to be applied in the practical design process. In [5] , a diversity index was proposed to quantify diversity. The diversity index is mainly determined by the number of different technologies used per subsystems. Although the diversity index is simple enough to be applied in the practical design process, the actual coupling extent between redundant components can't be quantified accurately. Therefore, this diversity index can't describe diversity precisely.
Considering the close relationship between CCF and diversity, the study of diversity usually accompanies the study of CCF and related CCF event data collection in the practical aspect. Representative researches have been performed in both the oil and gas industry and the nuclear industry. The oil companies have systematically collected reliability data for more than 25 years through the OREDA project [6] . However, the data collection is based on maintenance reports from single item failures. This approach does not easily provide information about CCFs and the status related to CCFs is therefore not fully known. Therefore, either CCFs or diversity are not studied thoroughly in the oil and gas industry. The nuclear industry is very concerned with CCFs and has been recording and analyzing CCF events for more than 30 years. An overview of CCF analysis methods for use in the U.S. commercial nuclear power industry was presented in [7] , which summarizes how data are gathered, evaluated, and coded into the CCF system, and describes the process for using the data to estimate CCF parameters. The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) [8] has initiated the International Common Cause Data Exchange (ICDE) project to encourage collection and analysis of data related to CCF events. As far as the research of diversity is concerned, human diversity, functional diversity and design diversity are considered to avoid common faults in [9] . Further, diversity strategies are evaluated quantitatively from the diversity attribute and criteria point of view in [10] . The process for using the Diversity Criterion Effectiveness (DCE) weights and the Diversity Attribute Effectiveness (DAE) weights to quantitatively evaluate the diversity strategies obtained from the sources of the nuclear power industry and non-nuclear industry is proposed. However, the algorithm to determine the DCE and DAE weights was based on the engineering experience in nature. For example, one of the DCE weight assumptions is that the DCE weights within a diversity attribute can be distributed uniformly according to the order and number of criteria within a diversity attribute. Therefore the adequacy of proposed diverse designs to address CCF is generally depending upon the experience and engineering judgment of the related staff.
As described above, while there is clear evidence that diversity can bring benefits in a redundant system, these benefits are extremely difficult to assess. Therefore, a novel CCF model which studies CCF from the viewpoint of Root Cause and Coupling Factor is proposed in this paper. The key parameters of the novel CCF model can be determined based on a stress-strength model by classifying the stressor and strength random variables into specific categories. An application example is provided that illustrates how the proposed CCF model performs for a chemical reactor safety system (CRSS) for protection against high pressure and temperature. The results not only confirm that diversity techniques lower the CCF probability but also provide quantitative assessment of how large the improvements can be in different diversity techniques. This paper is structured as follows. In Section II, the nature of diversity to enhance system reliability is analyzed from the Root Cause and Coupling Factor point of view. Then a novel CCF model is proposed and related model parameters are calculated based on a stress-strength model in Section III. An application example is provided that illustrates how the proposed CCF model performs for a chemical reactor safety system (CRSS) in Section IV. Finally Section V concludes the paper.
II. THE NATURE ANALYSIS OF DIVERSITY TO ENHANCE SYSTEM RELIABILITY

A. The principle of diversity
To illustrate the necessity of applying diversity in the process of designing redundant systems, consider an example of the N module redundant (NMR) system. As shown in Fig. 1 , there are N identical redundant components in the system, all of which use the same input. Generally N must be at least 3 (and should be odd). In execution, all redundant components are executed concurrently and majority voting is used to select the preferred output if there is disagreement. Failures are detected by comparing the results of the redundant components. Error location is done by assuming that components whose results do not "win" the vote contain an error. Suppose that one random fault occurs which leads to one certain component breaks (as shown in Fig. 1 ). The NMR system can detect and isolate this fault and the system can continue to work. However, if a design flaw exists all redundant components will break due to all of them are identical. In this case simple replication doesn't work and diversity is required. The rationale for diversity is that different designs will have different failure modes and will not be susceptible to the same common influences.
B. CCF and diversity analysis from Root Cause and
Coupling Factor point of view Many authors find it useful to split CCF causes into Root causes (RCs) and coupling factors (CFs). A RC is the basic reason why components fail (e.g., a harsh environment), while a CF is a characteristic of a group of components or piece-parts that identifies them as susceptible to the same causal mechanisms of failure (e.g., similarity in design, location, environment, mission, operation, maintenance, and test procedures). Much work [7] , [11] -- [13] has been done involving the RC classification and related data collection. In this paper four RC categories are considered, as shown in Table I . Accordingly, each RC category corresponds to a specific CF category. The explanations of each CF category are as shown in Table II . Represents causes related to a harsh external environment that is not within component design specifications. Specific mechanisms include electromagnetic interference, fire/ smoke, impact loads, moisture (sprays, floods, etc.), radiation, abnormally high or low temperature, and acts of nature.
From the viewpoint of RC and CF the diversity is intended to decrease the CF between redundant components and thus decrease the system CCF probability. Refers to the cases when operation of all (functionally or physically) identical components is governed by the same operating procedures.
Internal to Component based
Refers to the cases when the redundant components are designed based on the same principle and manufactured by the same material.
External Environment based
Refers to all redundant systems/components exposed to the same external environmental stresses. 
III. A NOVEL CCF MODEL AND CALCULATION OF ITS PARAMETERS BY A STRESS-STRENGTH MODEL
A. A novel CCF model
As shown in Fig. 2 , when diversity is applied in redundant systems, more than one CF which belongs to the different CF category respectively changes simultaneously in practice. Therefore, it is advisable to classify the RCs into categories and then assess the corresponding CFs between redundant components respectively based on the characteristics of diversity. Consequently, a novel CCF model is proposed as follows.
Where, n is the number of RC categories which are considered in CCF analysis.
RC i represents a specific category of RC, such as DCMI, EE, and so on.
CF i represents the corresponding CF of the RC i .
w i represents the weight value of the RC i which contributes to the CCF probability in total. The range of w i is [0.0-1.0] and the following constraint has to be satisfied:
B. Calculation of model parameters by a stress-strength model 1) Classifying random variables of stressors and strengths according to RC categories
According to the stress-strength view of reliability, failures occur when a stress (a combination of stressors) exceeds the associated strength of a component. Stressors can be electrical (voltages, currents, electromagnetic fields, etc.), mechanical (shock, vibration), physical (temperature, humidity), chemical (corrosive atmosphere), human (abuse, operational errors, maintenance errors), and so on. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 3 , four types of stressors are defined according to the four RC categories mentioned in section II. Accordingly, corresponding variables of strengths can be defined. Mathematically, stressors are random variables which can be characterized by probability density functions (pdfs). Component strength is also a random variable because components vary from unit to unit when manufactured. Thus, strengths can also be characterized with a pdfs.
2) Calculation of prob. of RC and CF
Although RC i and RC j (i is not equal to j) represents the different RC category respectively, which has the different practical meaning, the principle of calculating RC probability and the corresponding CF is the same from the stress-strength model point of view.
z Calculation of prob. of RC i
When a CCF occurs, it indicates that at least one certain type of stressor is big enough. For example, as far as CCF induced by the EE is concerned, a CCF occurs because a harsh environment exists, which implies that the environment related stressor is big enough. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 4 , the prob. of RC i is defined as follows.
Where, X represents the random variable of a specific type of stressor, X c represent the value of stressor critical point (SCP). 
z Calculation of CF i
According to the stress-strength failure model, failures occur when the stressor is greater than the component strength. Further, a CCF occurs when the stressor is greater than the strength of more than one component in the redundant system simultaneously. Therefore, as shown in Fig. 5 n refers to the number of the redundant components in the system.
IV. AN APPLICATION EXAMPLE
A. Description of the chemical reactor safety system
An application example is provided in this section that illustrates how the proposed CCF model performs for a chemical reactor safety system (CRSS) for protection against high pressure and temperature. Fig. 6 shows the CRSS, which is composed of four subsystems. The field instrumentation comprises both the pressure and temperature sensor/transmitter subsystems, and the final control element subsystem (basically composed of a set of actuator and shutdown valve). The logic solver subsystem is a safety PLC. These subsystems are referred as PT, TT, FC, and PLC respectively. The redundancy per subsystem can be varied from one to three channels, and each channel can be chosen from a few different technologies in order to implement diversity. Reliability analysis is performed aiming at the FC subsystem only in this paper and other subsystems can be dealt with similarly.
As far as system dangerous failure is concerned, the success criterion requires one or more valves function correctly. Therefore, the top event is expressed by the following logic:
Therefore, Common Cause Component Group (CCCG) can be represented as {FC 1 , FC 2 }. Four RC categories mentioned in section II are considered. The corresponding relationship of the variable i, RC categories, random variable names of stressors and strengths are shown in Table III . To compare the effects on CCF probability of different diversity techniques, CCF analysis is performed respectively in four different cases in total, which are described in detail in Table IV. 
B. Calculation of model parameters 1) Determination of w i
Due to the rare CCF event collected in the process industries the RC distribution of CCF events of representative actuators [14] in the nuclear power industry is used in order to determine w i . The RC distribution referred to is shown in Fig. 7 and consequently the value of w i is determined, as shown in Table V .
2) Calculation of prob. of RC i and CF i
Assume that all the stochastic variables representing the stressors and component strengths conform to Normal distribution. Obviously, not all stochastic variables of stressors and strengths will exhibit such statistical characteristics, but it is likely that many types of variables of stressors and strengths will. Further, note that the method proposed in this paper does not depend on variables of stressors and strengths being Normal distribution.
From the RC and CF point of view, the diversity is intended to decrease the CF between redundant components. Therefore, since the purpose of this example is to verify the effect of diversity on system reliability, it is reasonable to assume that the prob. of RC i is constant in all cases. Therefore, assume that all kinds of stressors conform N(0,1) distribution for convenience of calculating. Assume further that the value of X c equals to be 0.53. The practical value can be determined by related mapping algorithms based on reliability data base. Therefore, according to equation (3), the prob. of RC i can be calculated.
In the absence of significant field data about CCF, absolute quantification of the parameters of random variables' pdf is not possible. However, relative quantification, and the comparisons it supports, is both practical and useful. Therefore, the related parameters have to be hypothesized. To make the hypothesis reasonable, the following factors have been considered.
(1) The failure rate data of valves with different technologies in [5] .
(2) Reliability bath-tub curves for electrical and mechanical components in [15] .
(3) The electric and pneumatic valve is easy to maintain comparing to the hydraulic valve.
(4) Comparing to the hydraulic valve the electric valve is prone to be affected by external environment such as temperature, EMI and so on.
Consequently, the Mean and Variance parameters of strength random variables in different cases are set, as shown in Table VI . 
C. Discussion
As shown in Table VII , the results confirm that the diversity technique lowers the CCF probability. Further, the effects on CCF probability of different diversity techniques have been quantified. In Case (2), where only human diversity is applied, the CCF probability is not decreased substantially due to the weight percentage value of HE category to the CCF probability in total is relative low (w 3 =0.2). While in Case (3) and Case (4) , where design diversity is applied, the situation is complicated because more than one kind of strength variable is changed simultaneously. For example, as far as Case (3) is concerned, the electric valve has a higher failure rate comparing to the hydraulic valve, which make it a lower DCMI strength comparing to hydraulic valve. Comparing to the hydraulic valve, the advantage of the electric valve lies in that its performance is not decrease substantially as the lapse of time within the working period and can be monitored on line by automatic diagnosis technique. The disadvantage lies in that the failure rate is higher and is prone to be affected by external environment such as temperature, EMI, and so on. The characteristic mentioned above decrease the IC and HE contribution while increase the DCMI and EE contribution to the CCF probability in total. The CCF probability is decreased in the end due to the weight percentage of IC and HE is bigger than DCMI and EE.
V. CONCULSION AND PROSPECTS
Due to lack of knowledge about the actual probability densities of both the stressors and strengths, it is to be expected that the CCF probability computed would not represent absolute values. Rather, they are intended to compare the effects on CCF probability of different diversity techniques. RC and CF classification and related data collection have been performing in nuclear power industry domains for several decades. Work in the future is to develop mapping algorithms which can be used to determine the probability densities of both the stressors and strengths more accurately based on practical field reliability data.
